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Abstract
We introduce illustration identifying environmental degradation or improvement into a
2x2 coordination game with two pareto-ranked equilibria. Our contribution focuses on the
environmental nature of the information provided through the illustrations, and its eﬀects
on possible pro-environmental behaviour.
Our ﬁndings have some important consequences in terms of public policies. Incentives
based on sensitization campaigns for environmental issues can be an alternative to economic
instruments for environmental management.
1 Introduction
The social perception of environmental problems has evolved crucially over the last half century.
From an economic viewpoint, since the work by Boulding (1966) and Hardin (1968), the vision
of natural resources has moved from an anthropocentric one, considering homo oeconomicus
as a rational proﬁt-taker using natural resources to maximize utility, to an integrated one, where5
environmental equilibria are the basis for sustainable growth. The latter vision, synthetized in
the paradigm of ecological economics (Daly 1977, Costanza 1991) assigns the same relevance to
economic and ecological dynamics, underlying their respective interdependencies and intercon-
nections. The respect of these interconnections is the basic condition for achieving sustainable
development (Brundtland 1987). In terms of the economic analysis of human behaviour related10
to environmental problems, the standard economic model has evolved towards a Meta model
(Lynne 1999) through the introduction of new elements such as ethical, sociological and psy-
chological considerations. In this new model, personal interest based on a selﬁsh-hedonistic
behaviour and ethical/shared interest based on sympathy-empathy for the other members of so-
ciety are internalized into an integrated own-interest (Czap et al. 2012). This new representation15
of human behaviour, which for certain aspects, is in line with the concepts of limited or procedu-
ral rationality of behavioural economics (Simon 1982), encompasses innovative ideas compared
with mainstream neoclassical economics, such as social norms (Lewis 1969, Sugden 1986, Ostrom
∗CNRS,UMR 5474 LAMETA, F-34000 Montpellier, France. Contact: dimitri.dubois@lameta.univ-montp1.fr
†CIRAD, UMR 183 G EAU, F-34000 Montpellier, France. Contact: stefano.farolﬁ@cirad.fr
‡INRA, UMR 1135 LAMETA, F-34000 Montpellier, France. Contact: tidball@supagro.inra.fr
§Montpellier SupAgro, UMR 1135 LAMETA, F-34000 Montpellier, France. Contact: desole@supagro.inra.fr
¶INRA, UMR 1135 LAMETA, F-34000 Montpellier, France. Contact: hofstett@supagro.inra.fr
1
2000), warm glow (Andreoni 1989, 1990), altruism (Andreoni & Miller 2002) or reciprocity (Falk
& Fischbacher 2006, Gätcher & Hermann 2009). According to Schwartz (1970, 1973, 1977) the20
activation of personally held norms inﬂuences pro-social behaviour when two pre-conditions co-
exist: awareness of consequences and ascription to responsibility. Pro-environmental behaviour
(i.e. recycling of waste, green consumption, donations to environmental associations, etc.) is a
form of pro-social behaviour that consists mainly in contributing to a public good, creating a
positive externality or refraining from creating a negative one (Marciano & Roussel 2014).25
Following these concepts, the economic behaviour in terms of natural resource management,
approach to pollution problems, natural resource use, and public good contribution, can prove to
be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from that one prescribed by the standard economic theory. To explain
this behaviour, Nyborg et al. (2006) proposed a model of green consumers based on concepts such
as moral motivation and individual responsibility. Consumers choose environmentally friendly30
behaviour not only on the basis of their own perception, but also in accordances with the share
of the population around them that they believe chose pro-environmental behaviour. Laury &
Taylor (2008) showed the role of the components warm glow and altruism for the contribution
to a public good. Czap et al. (2012) used a contextualized experiment representing upstream
and downstream farmers who may use more or less polluting agricultural techniques to test the35
subjects' empathy and sympathy. Michel-Guillou & Moser (2006) discussed the dynamics of the
adoption by Fench farmers of environmental friendly cultural practices in terms of social rep-
resentations. More precisely, the main motivation for the adoption of less polluting techniques
seems to be the need for farmers to improve and defend the social image of their profession. On
the other hand, the adoption of less polluting techniques seems to lie behind an increased percep-40
tion of and greater commitment to environmental protection. Grolleau et al. (2012) showed that
when individuals exhibit positional, pro-social or conformist preferences, which are endogenous,
the outcomes in terms of private provision of public goods can diﬀer signiﬁcantly from traditional
neo-classical predictions.
Experimental economics (EE) plays a fundamental role in exploring these behaviours and par-45
ticularly in testing standard theories when compared to real life. The largely accepted mantra
in EE is represented by the absence of context (or abstraction) of laboratory conditions (Czap
et al. 2012) in order to allow as much control as possible of the studied parameters. Conversely,
several authors (Laury & Taylor 2008, Farolﬁ et al. 2014) recently called for introduction of
contextual elements in EE protocols in order to improve their external validity, but also to allow50
subjects to make visible in their behaviour those variables of the above-mentioned meta-economic
model. According to Michel-Guillou & Moser (2006) those variables depend on awareness of the
context and cannot be made explicit in an abstract situation. Laury & Taylor (2008) demon-
strated experimentally that an abstract protocol has less ability than a contextualized one to
predict subjects' contributions to a naturally occurring public good. Farolﬁ et al. (2014) proposed55
an analytical framework for studying the inﬂuence of context on players' behaviour composed
of four elements: repetition (R), illustration (I), communication (C) and experience (E). The
authors conﬁrmed through the RICE framework the hypotheses put forward by Faravelli (2007)
and Loewenstein (1999) that context provides players with indicators enabling them to behave in
accordance with a common representation of that context. According to Cooper & Kagel (2003),60
when learning processes are allowed, a weak contextual eﬀect would also allow behaviors to
converge more quickly toward theoretical predictions.
In this paper, we focus on illustration. We introduce basic connotations identifying envi-
ronmental degradation or improvement into a 2x2 coordination game with two pareto-ranked
equilibria, one risk-dominant and the other payoﬀ-dominant. This class of coordination games is65
called the stag hunt game. Our hypothesis is that environmental connotation may aﬀect issues
in situations with strategical interactions, either by moving away from the Nash equilibrium or
2
by selecting a particular equilibrium in the case of multiplicity. The structure of the stag hunt
game is of particular interest for this purpose1. This game admits several Nash equilibria, and
theoretical as well as experimental investigations do not give a clear cut on which equilibrium70
players should coordinate. Moreover, some papers deal with the eﬀect of labels placed on strate-
gies in this class of games, as for example Dugar & Shahriar (2012). The authors attach strong
labels to the payoﬀ-dominant strategy and manipulate the strength of the labels attached to the
risk-dominant strategy. They ﬁnd that the label attached to the alternative strategy does mat-
ter. Labels act as a key to determine a focal point into the game and as such facilitate players'75
coordination (Schelling 1960, Metha et al. 1994a,b). To our mind, an environmental connotation
is not a simple key for coordinating, it is rather a label that makes sense and refers to an intrinsic
motivation that may guide a pro-social behavior.
We show that environmental connotation inﬂuences signiﬁcantly subjects' behaviour, but
that this inﬂuence is constrained by the nature of the stag hunt game. In particular, our analysis80
shows that environmental negative signals impact more on players' behaviour over a repeated
session than positive signals. This result is consistent with the ﬁndings of previous work dealing
with subjects' appraisal of environmental values and with experimental tests of the inﬂuence
of rewards and punishments on subjects' behaviour. From a policy implication point of view,
this outcome is relevant as it suggests the use of warning campaigns for the protection of the85
environment as eﬀective tools to sensitize society. In terms of the dynamics observed, the main
result is the fact that choices of strategies are made basically during the ﬁrst repetitions of
interactions. This fact has policy implications, as it shows that players coordinate themselves
relatively soon and then maintain the equilibrium reached until the end of the game with few
exceptions. Policies based on the sensitization of consumers through information and awareness-90
raising campaigns would again ﬁnd in these outcomes some interesting suggestions, as they would
show that these campaigns modify consumers' behavior quickly and in a steady way.
The paper is composed of the following sections. Section 2 describes the experimental design
and our conjectures. Section 3 presents the results of our investigation, while section 4 discusses
them and indicates policy implications.95
2 Experimental design and conjectures
Experimental design
We consider a symmetric stag hunt game. Under its normal form, this game can be represented
as in table 1. With the conditions that a > c ≥ d > b and d − b > a − c this game admits two
pure-strategy Nash equilibria, XX and Y Y and one mixed-strategy equilibrium where strategy100
X is chosen with probability p = d−ba−b+d−c . Furthermore, XX is payoﬀ dominant and Y Y is
risk dominant (Harsanyi & Selten 1988). The payoﬀ-dominance notion is obvious, since a > d.
Risk-dominance is more complicated. Y Y is said to be risk-dominant because adopting this
strategy is less risky than adopting X. Indeed X has to be chosen by the opponent with a high
probability (p > 0.5) to have an expected payoﬀ equal to that of Y .105
The parameters used for the experiment are a = 10, b = 5, c = 9.25 and d = 8, as reported
in table 2. The game is based on game 2 of Dubois et al. (2012), with payoﬀs divided by 42. In
order to test for the eﬀects of environmental connotations on strategy choices and coordination
issues, we ran ﬁve treatments (table 3): a baseline without connotation, two treatments where
1We could also have used a prisoner's dilemma game or a public good game, but these games have a diﬀerent
structure: they introduce a social dilemma; a conﬂict between the unique Nash equilibrium and a Pareto optimal
issue. The study of a prisoner's dilemma game is a possible extension of this work.
2We divided values by 4 in order to avoid the use of a conversion rate. The payoﬀs in the matrix are euros.
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Player B
X Y
Player A
X a, a b, c
Y c, b d, d
Table 1: A symmetric stag hung game, with a > c ≥ d > b and d− b > a− c
one option has a positive environmental connotation (treatments XEP and Y EP ) and two110
treatments where one option has a negative environmental connotation (XEN and Y EN).
Player B
X Y
Player A
X 10, 10 5, 9.25
Y 9.25, 5 8, 8
Table 2: The game experimented
The environmental connotations are very simple and generic in order to be easily understand-
able and to avoid a strong personal interpretation. Indeed our objective is to analyze the eﬀects
of a pro or neutral (anti) environmental connotation in coordination problems, not to lead
the subject to rely on his/her own experience or imagination, which would result in a lost of115
control in the experiment. What we call connotation in our protocol is a short sentence added at
the end of the instructions. The sentence with a positive environmental connotation on option
X (Y in treatment Y EP ) is the following: X preserves the environment. The negative one is
X degrades the environment.
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Illustrated option
X Y
Environmental
illustration
∅ Baseline
− XEN Y EN
+ XEP Y EP
Table 3: The treatments
The experiment took place in the experimental laboratory of Montpellier (LAMETA-LEEM)
in July and September 2014. A total of 178 subjects participated in the computerized3 exper-
iment, including some students from various disciplines of the University of Montpellier4. The
experiment is divided into four parts: a one-shot stag hunt game, a repeated stag hunt game, a
simple portfolio choice and a questionnaire to capture the subjects' sensitivity to environmental125
concerns (the New Environmental Paradigm  NEP  scale).
In the general instructions5 the subjects are informed that: i) the experiment is composed
3The computer program is based on LE2M, the software dedicated to experimental economics developed in
Montpellier by Dubois, D. and Rousselle, J.M.
4The organization of the experimental sessions as well as the subjects' database is managed by ORSEE (Greiner
2004).
5Instructions are available from the authors on request.
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of three independent parts and a questionnaire; ii) the instructions of each part are given only
when the previous part is ﬁnished and iii) payments are based on only one of the three parts
randomly drawn.130
Let us now detail the content of each part. In the ﬁrst part randomly formed pairs of players,
play the stag hunt game reported in table 2 in one-shot. In the instructions of part 2, the
subjects are informed that they are to stay with the same partner as in part 1. In the second
part the subjects participate in the same game repeated for 20 periods. In part 3 the subjects
participate in a simple real-money portfolio choice designed to capture their sensitivity to risky135
decisions (Gneezy & Potters 1997, Beaud & Willinger 2015). The subjects then answer the NEP
scale questionnaire (Dunlap & Van Liere 1978). The NEP scale aims to measure public pro-
environmental orientation. The NEP focuses on beliefs about humanity's ability to upset the
balance of nature, the existence of limits to growth for human societies, and humanity's right to
rule over the rest of nature. The questionnaire was slightly completed and classiﬁed by Dunlap140
et al. (2000) trying to capture the ideas of ecological consciousness and anthropocentrism
versus ecocentrism.
Conjectures
The experiment is designed to test the following conjectures about the expected eﬀect on players'
decisions of an environmentally connotated strategy.145
Conjecture 1 An environmental connotation attached to a strategy aﬀects players' choices of
that strategy
This is our main conjecture. Several papers have shown that a pro-environmental behaviour
exists that leads people to take decisions inconsistent with pure maximizing concerns, such as
waste recycling, green consumption or donations to environmental associations (Marciano &150
Roussel 2014). For Schwartz (1970, 1973, 1977) and Stern et al. (1993, 1999) pro-environmental
behaviour belongs to the class of pro-social behaviours with the speciﬁcity that it also concerns
nonhuman species.
Conjecture 2 A positive (resp. negative) environmental connotation attached to a strategy
increases (resp. decreases) the frequency of choice of that strategy compared to the baseline155
We assume that, in general, the players have a pro-environmental behaviour or at least they are
neutral.
Conjecture 3 A negative environmental connotation has a stronger eﬀect than a positive one
Some experimental results have shown that people are more sensitive to loss than to gains with
respect to climate and environmental issues (Newman et al. 2012) and to punishments than to160
rewards (Bravo & Squazzoni 2013). Applied to our context, theses ﬁndings may imply that a
negative connotation has a stronger impact than a positive one.
Conjecture 4 Repetition has no additional eﬀect with respect to environmental connotation
The repeated game is built such that players are not incentivized to inﬂuence their partner deci-
sion (partner matching and only one randomly selected period is paid). Additionally, we believe165
that the players have a some kind of myopic behavior with respect to information. Therefore,
strategic considerations might quickly replace the environmental considerations. In other words
we do not expect environmental connotations to aﬀect the dynamic of the repeated game.
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3 Results
3.1 One-shot game170
[Insert figure 1 here]
Figure 1 shows the distribution of the average frequency of X in each treatment. The fre-
quency of the X choice in the baseline treatment is 67.00%. This frequency is very close to the
68.75% observed by Dubois et al. (2012) in the ﬁrst period of their game 2 which diﬀers only in
that payoﬀs are multiplied by four6.175
The average frequencies of X in treatments XEP and Y EN , at 71.00% and 64.00% re-
spectively, are not statistically diﬀerent compared to the baseline treatment (Mann Whitney
two-sided test7, p-value=0.884 and 0.806). The averages between these two treatments do not
diﬀer either (MW p-value=0.663). However, there is a strong eﬀect towards a less frequent choice
of X when the environmental connotation encourages to move away from it: the X strategy fre-180
quency falls to 36% in treatment XEN and to 31% in Y EP , which is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence
compared to the baseline8 (MW p-value=0.024 and 0.008 respectively).
The observations in the one-shot game show that the environmental connotation has an
inﬂuence in terms of strategy choice. However, this choice is constrained by the nature of the185
stag hunt game. A statistically signiﬁcant reduction in the choice of X with respect to the
baseline treatment is observable when this strategy is described as degrading the environment.
On the other hand, no statistically signiﬁcant increase in the choice of X is observed when this
strategy is presented as able to preserve the environment. Actually, that connotation go against
the game's structure in terms of guiding players' choices. When the connotation pushes players190
to a choice that goes in the same direction as the strategies' basin of attraction, then the players
follow it. Conversely, when the connotation pushes players in a direction contrary to the basin
of attraction, then its inﬂuence is statistically not signiﬁcant. The analysis of the data therefore
partially conﬁrms conjectures 1 and 2 while conjecture 3 is not veriﬁed.
3.2 Repeated game195
[Insert figure 2 here]
Figure 2 shows the distribution of the average frequency of X in each treatment. The choice
of X is signiﬁcantly lower in XEN and Y EP compared to the baseline (MW, XEN vs Baseline
p-value=0.010, Y EP vs Baseline p-value=0.012). Introducing a positive connotation for X is
not suﬃcient to increase the choice of this strategy compared to the baseline (XEP vs Baseline200
p-value=0.986). Conversely, a negative connotation for Y strongly aﬀects the decisions, as the
frequency with which X is chosen approaches 100%, which is signiﬁcantly higher than in the
baseline and XEP treatments (MW p-value=0.062 and 0.042 respectively)9.
In the baseline treatment and in both treatments with the positively oriented environmental
6In particular the two games share the same mixed strategy equilibrium (p=0.8) and the same relative
riskiness ratio (RR = 0.25). The relative riskiness of the safe strategy relative to the risky one is deﬁned by the
ratio of their expected payoﬀ ranges: RR =
|c−d|
a−b . A Mann Whitney two-sided test conﬁrms that there is no
signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the observed frequency of X in both games (p-value=0.751).
7Hereafter MW. Since the independent data in our experiment is the group, all the statistical tests are based
on this unit of observation.
8As well as to treatments XEP and Y EN .
9More precisely, the frequency is 97% if we exclude the group which clearly stand out from the other with a
very low frequency of X choice (2%). With this group the p-values are 0.117 and 0.090 respectively.
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connotation (XEP and Y EP ) the average frequency of X stays virtually around the same205
level as in the one-shot game: 68.00% in the baseline, 70.00% in XEP and 28.00% in Y EP .
Conversely in both treatments with the negative environmental connotation the frequencies of
the payoﬀ dominant strategy X are more extreme: a choice of X that reaches 92.00% in Y EN
and falls to 21.00% in XEN . These two values are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from those observed in
the one-shot decision (Wilcoxon two-sided test: p-value=0.033 for XEN and p-value=0.006 for210
Y EN).
[Insert figure 3 here]
Figure 3 gives the average frequency of X in the one-shot game and the evolution of X in the
repeated game for each treatment. As the pairs remain unchanged between the one-shot and the
repeated game and throughout the latter the ﬁrst periods of play are the most important part215
of the coordination game. For three out of ﬁve treatments (Baseline, XEP and Y EP ) there
is almost no diﬀerence between the one-shot decision and the decision at the beginning of the
repeated game. Conversely for the two treatments with the negative environmental connotation
(XEN and Y EN), a strong dynamic occurs in the very ﬁrst repetitions. In XEN the frequency
of X in the one-shot, 36%, falls to 22% in period 3. The change in the Y EN treatment is even220
more pronounced, from 64% in the one-shot to 86% in period 2 and 94% in period 6. After
period 6, in each game the dynamic is quite stable. As mentioned above this is a consequence of
the partner matching we chose in the experiment.
To summarize, two main diﬀerences are observed in the repeated game with respect to the225
one-shot. In Y EN the choice of strategy X is signiﬁcantly higher than in the baseline. In
XEN the frequency of X, which was already signiﬁcantly lower in the one-shot compared to the
baseline, becomes even lower. As a consequence, conjectures 1 and 2 are conﬁrmed in XEN ,
Y EP and Y EN but not in XEP , where conjecture 3 is conﬁrmed and conjecture 4 is rejected.
[Insert figure 4 here]230
Figure 4 shows the changes in coordination rate, corresponding to the frequency with which
the two players choose the same strategy. We observe ﬁrstly that there is no diﬀerence between
treatments in either the one-shot (67%, 61%, 53%, 61% and 61%) or the repeated game (95%,
91%, 95%, 96% and 92%). Environmental connotation therefore aﬀects the equilibrium towards
which pairs converge but not their success in coordinating. Secondly, we ﬁnd that the coordina-235
tion rate strongly increases at the beginning of the repeated game (ﬁrst ﬁve periods) and then
remains quite stable until the end of the repetitions, whatever the treatment. The environmental
connotation does not aﬀect the dynamics of coordination either.
3.3 The New Environmental Paradigm (NEP) scale and investment in
the portfolio choice240
The (revisited) NEP scale (Dunlap et al. 2000) is a test that captures the sensitivity of the
subject to environmental concerns. The questionnaire contains a set of 15 items. The eight
odd-numbered items refer to a pro-ecological behaviour and the seven even-numbered ones to a
disagreement with the pro-ecological world view. Moreover, the items were classiﬁed according
to the following ﬁve central ideas: (i) the reality of limits to growth (questions 1, 6, and 11), (ii)245
antianthropocentrism (questions 2, 7, and 12), (iii) the fragility of nature's balance (questions
3, 8, and 13), (iv) rejection of exemptionalism (questions 4, 9, and 14), and (v) the possibility
of an ecocrisis (questions 5, 10, and 15). The participants in the experiment answered the 15
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questions, which we carefully translated into french. Figure 5 shows the distribution of the NEP
coeﬃcients.250
[Insert figure 5 here]
The observed coeﬃcients are in accordance with the literature in this ﬁeld (Dunlap et al.
2000, Kotchen & Reiling 2000). The average value for the NEP coeﬃcient is 55.4 compared to
54.8 and 54.1 for the NEP coeﬃcients estimated during the contingent valuation of two diﬀerent
endangered species (Kotchen & Reiling 2000).255
[Insert figure 6 here]
In order to capture the sensitivity of the subjects to risky decisions, they also participated in a
portfolio choice game. More precisely, the participants have an initial endowment of 10 euros and
have to decide its allocation between a safe asset (return rate equal to 1) and a risky one where
the rate of return is k˜ = (0, 1/2; 3, 1/2), i.e. with a probability 1/2 that they lose the amount260
invested and with a probability 1/2 that they get back three times their investment. Figure
6 shows the distribution of the amount invested in the risky option. On average the subjects
invested 4.24 euros in the risky option, and the third quartile corresponds to an investment of
6 euros, which means than most of the subjects are rather risk-averse, as usually observed in
economic experiments (Holt & Laury 2002).265
[Insert figure 7 here]
As depicted in ﬁgure 7 and conﬁrmed by a Pearson's correlation test, there is no link between
the subjects' environmental concerns and their sensitivity to risk (ρ = −0.065, p-value=0.386).
In order to test for the existence of a relationship between the subjects' proﬁle in these two
dimensions and their choice in the coordination game we group subjects according to their270
coeﬃcient in the NEP scale and to the amount they invested in the portfolio choice. In the
former dimension we split subjects depending on whether their NEP coeﬃcient is strictly lower
than the median of the observed coeﬃcients (NL) or not (NH). We applied the same rule for the
risk dimension, i.e. IL if the subject invested strictly less than the median of the observations
and IH otherwise. Combining the two criteria, the subjects are therefore classiﬁed according to275
four proﬁles: NLIL, NLIH , NHIL and NHIH . We put forward the following conjectures.
Conjecture 5 IL (resp. IH) subjects more frequently choose the risk-dominant (resp. payoﬀ-
dominant) strategy
We wanted to test the relationship between the subject's risk-aversion and his/her choice
in a game with a risky strategy. This has been tested by Eckel & Wilson (2004) in the trust280
game where the usual conjecture is that greater risk aversion leads to less trust. Some authors,
on the contrary, ﬁnd that trustfulness is not correlated with sensitivity to risk. We are aware
of the paper by Buyukboyaci (2014), which observe that, in the stag hunt game, a subject's
propensity to choose the risky action does not depend on his/her own risk attitude but rather
on his/her opponent's risk attitude. However, due to the speciﬁc protocol used by the author in285
her experiment we still believe that our conjecture is testable in our case.
Conjecture 6 NH subjects are more sensitive to environmental connotation
We restrict the conjecture to the NH type since it would be false to consider that the NL
type is anti-environment.
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[Insert figure 8 here]290
Figure 8 shows for each treatment the average frequency of the X choice depending on the
proﬁles, in the one-shot game and in the repeated game. Some observations are in line with the
conjectures but some are not. Let us start with those that are.
In treatment XEP the data are very consistent with our conjectures. On average, the subjects
with the highest coeﬃcient in the NEP scale, NH type, more frequently choose X than NL.295
Moreover, in both classes, the subjects who invested more in the portfolio choice (type IH),
choose X more frequently than the others (type IL). More precisely, the average frequencies
of X in the repeated game are as follows: NLIL: 55.00%, NLIH : 66.67%, NHIL: 72.27% and
NHIH : 73.46%. In treatment Y EN , type NHIH chooses X at a frequency of 97.86%, followed
by type NLIH with a frequency of 95.71%. As for the other two types of subject, NLIL and300
NHIL, the latter chooses X with a higher frequency (92.50%) than the former (83.13%).
In the one-shot game of treatment Y EP the choices are consistent with the conjectures. In the
repeated game the NLIH type chooses X with a higher frequency than the other types almost all
the time, while the frequency with which type NLIL selects X is below that of the other types in
most periods. NH types, IL and IH , behave in the same way. In other words, in this treatment it305
seems that the risk-aversion dimension matters for the subjects with low environmental concern
but not for the subjects with a higher ones.
Conversely, in treatment XEN the NHIL type clearly more frequently chooses X than the other
types, contrary to our conjectures. However, for more than half of the repetitions, type NLIH
chooses X with a frequency above types NLIL and NHIH . In the baseline treatment the envi-310
ronmental concern dimension should not matter since no context is introduced into the game.
According to conjecture 5 IH types should select X more frequently than IL's. This is not found
in our data.
To summarize, in both treatments where the environmental illustration is in favour of the riskier
payoﬀ-dominant strategy, the subjects' choices are in accordance with conjectures 5 and 6. This315
is less evident in the other connotated treatments as well as in the baseline. In terms of conjecture
5, an avenue for further investigation could be to relate strategy choices with ambiguity-aversion
instead of risk-aversion as we have done so far. Ambiguity would seem to refer to the belief
dimension about the opponent's choice while risk-aversion is purely linked to the game's proba-
bilities.320
4 Discussion
This article set out to discover whether basic environmental illustration inﬂuences players' eco-
nomic behaviour. We test hypotheses about this research question through an experiment based
on a symmetric stag hunt game. Both one-shot and repeated games were implemented. The
one-shot game clearly shows that environmental connotation has an inﬂuence in terms of strat-325
egy choice, and the positive or negative nature of the environmental connotation positively or
negatively aﬀects the frequency of players' choices. However, that modiﬁcation is constrained
by the nature of the stag hunt game. Environmental connotation is therefore inﬂuential on the
players' behaviour, but it goes against the game's structure in terms of guiding players' choices.
A further analysis in this direction could consist in testing the same connotations in games with330
a diﬀerent structure and less risk of X, and comparing the results with those observed in the
current set-up.
In repeated games, we observe a similar result to that in the one-shot games except when the risk-
dominant strategy is environmentally negatively connotated. In the latter condition the choice
of the payoﬀ-dominant strategy dramatically increases. This ﬁnding suggests that negative en-335
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vironmental signals impact more on players' behaviour than positive signals over a repeated
session. This is consistent with previous work dealing with subjects' appraisal of environmental
values (Newman et al. 2012) and with experimental tests of the inﬂuence of rewards and pun-
ishments on subjects' behaviour (Bravo & Squazzoni 2013). According to Shogren et al. (2010),
in addition to the fact that willingness to pay (WTP) measures are more accurate than willing-340
ness to accept (WTA) measures in terms of subjects' capacity to induce environmental values,
WTP for positive values is more consistent with theoretical expectations, while people tend to
overbid' negative environmental values. According to Bravo & Squazzoni (2013), punishment
has a stronger eﬀect on cooperation than rewards. This is in line with the idea that the stick
(here a negative impact on the environment) is more eﬀective than the carrot (here a positive345
impact on the environment) in changing subjects' behaviour. From a policy implication point of
view, this outcome is relevant as it suggests the use of warning campaigns for the protection of
the environment as eﬀective tools to sensitize society and thereby induce a behavioural change
in the direction of either a reduced negative practice or an increased positive one.
As regards the dynamics observed during the repeated games, the main result is the fact that the350
choices of strategies are made basically during the ﬁrst repetitions of the game. In other words,
due also to the ﬁxed-pair nature of the groups, players coordinate and reach a Nash equilibrium
in the very ﬁrst repetitions and in the majority of cases select the same strategy up to the end of
the game. To check for the inﬂuence of environmental connotation over time, a further test could
be made by introducing it in the middle of the repetitions, and observe whether the strategy355
on which the players coordinate is modiﬁed by the introduction of environmental connotation.
Policies based on consumer sensitization through information and awareness-raising campaigns
would again ﬁnd in these outcomes some interesting suggestions, as they would show the speed
and stability of consumers' behaviour changes under the inﬂuence of environmental campaigns.
Further extensions of these experiments will consist in analysing larger groups to avoid the ﬁxed-360
pair eﬀect and in introducing environmental connotations into the two strategies at the same
time as Dugar & Shahriar (2012) did in their experiment, to observe the possible facilitation of
coordination through the introduction of illustration.
Results from the NEP scale test tally with the literature in this ﬁeld (Dunlap et al. 2000, Kotchen
& Reiling 2000) and the eﬀect of environmental connotations on strategy choice is partially in365
line with the NEP ﬁndings. Similarly, the investment portfolio test partially explains the attitude
of players with regard to the risk observed in the game An avenue for further investigation in
this ﬁeld could be to relate strategy choices to ambiguity aversion rather than to risk aversion,
with ambiguity referring to the belief dimension about the opponent's choice, while risk aversion
is purely linked to the game's probabilities.370
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Figure 1: Distribution of the average frequency of X in the one-shot game
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Figure 2: Distribution of the average frequency of X in the repeated game
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Figure 3: Evolution of the frequency of strategy X in the repeated game
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Figure 4: Evolution of the coordination rate, in the one-shot and repeated game
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Figure 6: Distribution of the amount invested in the risky option of the portfolio choice problem
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Figure 7: Correlation between NEP scale coeﬃcient and sensitivity to risk
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Figure 8: Choices according to NEP and Risk proﬁles
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